Complete 911 Timeline
United Airlines Flight 93
Project: Complete 911 Timeline
Open-Content project managed by matt, Paul, KJF
All the alleged 9/11 hijackers reportedly check in at the airports from where they board Flights 11, 175, 77, and 93. [Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 1-4.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 1-4; Staff report: The four flights, 27, 89, 93.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 27, 89, 93 
] Since 1998, the FAA has required air carriers to implement a program called the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS). This identifies those passengers who might be a security risk, based upon suspicious behavior such as buying one-way tickets or paying with cash. CAPPS also randomly assigns some passengers to receive additional security scrutiny. If a particular passenger has been designated as a “selectee,” this information is transmitted to the airport’s check-in counter, where a code is printed on their boarding pass. At the airport’s security checkpoints, selectees are subjected to additional security measures. [US News and World Report, 1 April 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">US News and World Report, 4/1/2002; Public Hearing.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 1/27/2004; Hearing On The Status Of The Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II), 108th Cong., 2nd Sess. Congressional Record.')" onmouseout="return nd()">US Congress, 3/17/2004; Staff report: The four flights, 2, 85.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 2, 85 ] Their baggage is to be screened for explosives or held off the plane until they have boarded. Supposedly, the thinking behind this is that someone smuggling a bomb onto a plane won’t get onto that same flight. According to the 9/11 Commission, nine of the 19 hijackers are flagged by the CAPPS system before boarding Flights 11, 175, 77, and 93. [Washington Post, 28 January 2004.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 1/28/2004; Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 84.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 84; United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui, a/k/a Shaqil, a/k/a Abu Khalid al Sahrawi, Defendant, 3/6/2006] In addition, Mohamed Atta was selected when he checked in at the airport in Portland, for his earlier connecting flight to Boston (see 5:33 a.m.-5:40 a.m. September 11, 2001). All of the hijackers subsequently pass through security checkpoints before boarding their flights. [Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 1-4.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 1-4]
Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight UA 175, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93, Key Day of 9/11 Events
About an hour before boarding Flight 93, Ziad Jarrah phones his girlfriend, Aysel Senguen, who is currently recovering from a minor operation in a hospital in Germany, where she lives. [Los Angeles Times, 23 October 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Los Angeles Times, 10/23/2001; Observer, 22 August 2004.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Observer, 8/22/2004] Senguen will later recount, “[H]e was very brief. He said he loved me three times. I asked what was up. He hung up shortly afterwards.… It was so short and rather strange him saying that repeatedly.” [Reuters, 19 November 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Reuters, 11/19/2002; Guardian, 20 November 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Guardian, 11/20/2002] Some accounts say Jarrah makes this call from his hotel, the Days Inn in Newark. Other accounts claim he makes it from a payphone at the airport, although he does not actually check in there until later on, at 7:39 a.m. [PBS Frontline.')" onmouseout="return nd()">PBS, 1/17/2002; Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 532.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 532; Observer, 22 August 2004.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Observer, 8/22/2004; Sunday Herald (Glasgow), 22 August 2004.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Sunday Herald (Glasgow), 8/22/2004; Staff report: The four flights, 35.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 35 ]
Entity Tags: Ziad Jarrah, Aysel Senguen
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Ziad Jarrah
Sometime during this period, the hijackers pass through airport security checkpoints at the various airports. The FAA has a screening program in place called the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS). CAPPS automatically targets passengers for additional screening based on suspicious behavior such as buying one-way tickets or paying with cash. If a passenger is selected, their bags are thoroughly screened for explosives, but their bodies are not searched. [Washington Post, 28 January 2004.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 1/28/2004] CAPPS selects three of the five Flight 11 hijackers. Since Waleed Alshehri checked no bags, his selection had no consequences. Wail Alshehri and Satam Al Suqami have their bags scanned for explosives, but are not stopped. No Flight 175 hijackers are selected. Only Ahmad Alhaznawi is selected from Flight 93. His bag is screened for explosives, but he is not stopped. The 9/11 Commission later concludes that Alhaznawi and Ahmed Alnami, also headed to Flight 93, have suspicious indicators and that they could have been linked to al-Qaeda upon inspection, but it has not been explained why or how. [Public Hearing.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 1/27/2004; Baltimore Sun, 27 January 2004.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Baltimore Sun, 1/27/2004] Screening of the Flight 77 hijackers is described below.
According to the 9/11 Commission, between 7:03 a.m. and 7:39 a.m. the four alleged Flight 93 hijackers check in at the United Airlines ticket counter at Newark (New Jersey) Liberty International Airport. Only Ahmad Alhaznawi is selected for additional scrutiny by airport security under the FAA’s CAPPS program (see (6:20 a.m.-7:48 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The only consequence is that his checked bag is screened for explosives, and not loaded onto the plane until it is confirmed that he has boarded. [Public Hearing.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 1/27/2004; Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 4.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 4; Staff report: The four flights, 35.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 35 ] On their way to boarding the plane, all four would pass through a security checkpoint, which has three walk-through metal detectors, two X-ray machines, and explosive trace detection equipment. [Staff report: The four flights, 97.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 97 ] The 9/11 Commission later claims Newark Airport has no video cameras monitoring its security checkpoints, so there is no documentary evidence showing when the hijackers passed through the checkpoint or what alarms may have been triggered. [Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 4.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 4; Staff report: The four flights, 35.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 35 ] However, Michael Taylor, the president of a security company, who has done consulting work for the New York Port Authority (which operates the airport), claims that Newark does use security cameras at the time of 9/11. [Boston Herald, 29 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Boston Herald, 9/29/2001] All of the screeners on duty at the checkpoint are subsequently interviewed, and none report anything unusual or suspicious having occurred. [Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 4.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 4; Staff report: The four flights, 35.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 35 ] The 9/11 Commission later concludes that the passports of Ahmad Alhaznawi and fellow Flight 93 hijacker Ahmed Alnami have suspicious indicators and could have been linked to al-Qaeda, but it does not elaborate on this. [Baltimore Sun, 27 January 2004.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Baltimore Sun, 1/27/2004]
Entity Tags: Ahmed Alnami, Al-Qaeda, Newark International Airport, Federal Aviation Administration, Ahmed Alhaznawi, United Airlines, Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
Two passengers leave Flight 93 after hearing an announcement that there will be a five-minute delay in the plane pushing back from the gate. This is according to Terry Tyksinski, a longtime flight attendant with United Airlines, who says a customer service supervisor who witnessed the incident told her about it six months after 9/11. The two first-class passengers are reportedly of dark complexion, “kind of black, not black.” According to Tyksinski, the supervisor notes their names and is subsequently twice interviewed by the FBI. [Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., xiii-xiv.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. xiii-xiv] No other accounts, including the 9/11 Commission Report, mention this incident. [Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004] And while Flight 93 is delayed on the ground until 8:42 a.m., reports state that it pushes back from the gate just one minute later than its scheduled departure, rather than there being a five-minute delay as Tyksinski suggests. [Boston Globe, 23 November 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Boston Globe, 11/23/2001; MSNBC, 11 September 2006.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 9/11/2006] There will only be 37 passengers on Flight 93, including the four hijackers. This is 20 percent of the plane’s passenger capacity of 182 and, according to the 9/11 Commission, “is considerably below the 52 percent average load factor for Flight 93 for Tuesdays in the three-month period prior to September 11.” [Staff report: The four flights, 36.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 36 ]
Entity Tags: Terry Tyksinski
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
Flight 93 is delayed for 41 minutes on the runway at Newark Airport, New Jersey. It will take off at 8:42 a.m. [Newsweek, 22 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Newsweek, 9/22/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, “Flight 93: Forty lives, one destiny,” 28 October 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001; Boston Globe, 23 November 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Boston Globe, 11/23/2001] Apparently, it has to wait in a line of about a dozen planes before it can take off. [USA Today, 11 August 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">USA Today, 8/11/2002] According to the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, the delay is partly due to a fire at the airport the previous afternoon that had led to the runways being closed for 34 minutes. [CNN Breaking News.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 9/10/2001; Bergen Record, 11 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Bergen Record, 9/11/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, “Flight 93: Forty lives, one destiny,” 28 October 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001] But the 9/11 Commission says it is “because of the airport’s typically heavy morning traffic.” [Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 10.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 10] And the Boston Globe later reports that United Airlines “will not explain why” Flight 93 was delayed on the runway. [Boston Globe, 23 November 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Boston Globe, 11/23/2001] NBC News comments, “That delay would give passengers on Flight 93 the time to realize that this was a suicide mission and the chance to thwart it.” [MSNBC, 11 September 2006.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 9/11/2006] CNN adds that it therefore “likely saved the White House or the US Capitol from destruction.” [CNN American Morning.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 9/11/2006]
In the event of a hijacking, all airline pilots are trained to key an emergency four-digit code into their plane’s transponder. This would surreptitiously alert air traffic controllers, causing the letters “HJCK” to appear on their screens. [CNN CNN.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 9/13/2001; Newsday, 13 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Newsday, 9/13/2001; News (Portugal), 3 August 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">News (Portugal), 8/3/2002; Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 17-18.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 17-18] The action, which pilots should take the moment a hijack situation is known, only takes seconds to perform. [Christian Science Monitor, 12 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Christian Science Monitor, 9/12/2001; CNN CNN.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 9/12/2001] Yet during the hijackings of flights 11, 175, 77, and 93, none of the pilots do this. [CNN CNN.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 9/11/2001]
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight UA 175, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93
Flight 93 takes off from Newark International Airport, bound for San Francisco, California. It leaves 41 minutes late because of heavy runway traffic. [Newsweek, 22 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Newsweek, 9/22/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 28 October 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001; Associated Press, “Terrorist Attacks Timeline,” 19 August 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 8/19/2002; MSNBC, “What Happened on Flight 93? A story of heroism that inspired Americans in their darkest hours,” 3 September 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 9/3/2002; 9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
CNN reports that, while Flight 11 is heading toward the World Trade Center, “[S]ources say there were bomb threats called in to air traffic control centers adding to the chaos.” One center receiving such threats is the FAA’s Boston Center, which handles air traffic over New England and monitors flights 11 and 175. Cleveland Center, which will monitor Flight 93, receives similar threats. Whether other centers are threatened is unstated. According to Newsweek, “Officials suspect that the bomb threats were intended to add to the chaos, distracting controllers from tracking the hijacked planes.” [Newsweek, 22 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Newsweek, 9/22/2001; CNN CNN Sunday.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 9/30/2001] Yet, just weeks after 9/11, the Washington Post will claim, “Federal aviation officials no longer believe that accomplices of the hijackers made phony bomb threats to confuse air traffic controllers on Sept. 11. Sources said reports of multiple threats were apparently the result of confusion during the early hours of the investigation and miscommunication in the Federal Aviation Administration.” [Washington Post, 27 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 9/27/2001]
Entity Tags: Cleveland flight control, Boston flight control
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 11, Flight UA 93
According to a statement by two high-level FAA officials, “Within minutes after the first aircraft hit the World Trade Center, the FAA immediately established several phone bridges [i.e., telephone conference calls] that included FAA field facilities, the FAA command center, FAA headquarters, DOD, the Secret Service, and other government agencies.” The FAA shares “real-time information on the phone bridges about the unfolding events, including information about loss of communication with aircraft, loss of transponder signals, unauthorized changes in course, and other actions being taken by all the flights of interest, including Flight 77. Other parties on the phone bridges in turn shared information about actions they were taken.” The statement says, “The US Air Force liaison to the FAA immediately joined the FAA headquarters phone bridge and established contact with NORAD on a separate line.” [Public Hearing: September 11, 2001: The Attacks And The Response and Reforming Civil Aviation Security: Next Steps.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003] Another account says the phone bridges are “quickly established” by the Air Traffic Services Cell (ATSC). This is a small office at the FAA’s Herndon Command Center, which is staffed by three military officers at the time of the attacks (see (Before 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). It serves as the center’s liaison with the military. According to Aviation Week and Space Technology, the phone bridges link “key players, such as NORAD’s command center, area defense sectors, key FAA personnel, airline operations and the NMCC.” [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 10 June 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/10/2002; Twelfth Public Hearing.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] If these accounts are correct, it means someone at NORAD should learn about Flight 77 when it deviates from its course (see (8:54 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, the 9/11 Commission will later claim that the FAA teleconference is established about 30 minutes later (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The Air Force liaison to the FAA will claim she only joins it after the Pentagon is hit (see (Soon After 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Secret Service, US Department of Defense, Air Traffic Services Cell
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93, Key Day of 9/11 Events
A soldier monitors a NORAD radar screen. [Source: National War College]For the past two days, NORAD has had fighters deployed to Alaska and Northern Canada. They are there for a real-world maneuver called Operation Northern Vigilance, tasked with monitoring a Russian air force exercise being conducted in the Russian Arctic all this week (see September 9-11, 2001). [NORAD, 9/9/2001] At its operations center deep inside Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, NORAD is also reportedly at “full ‘battle staff’ levels for a major annual exercise that tests every facet of the organization.” Canadian Captain Mike Jellinek is one hour into his shift, overseeing the operations center, when he is contacted by NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), based in Rome, NY: The FAA believes there is a hijacking in progress and is asking NORAD for support. As the Toronto Star reports, “In a flash, Operation Northern Vigilance is called off. Any simulated information, what’s known as an ‘inject,’ is purged from the screens.” [Toronto Star, 9 December 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Toronto Star, 12/9/2001] NORAD has the capacity to inject simulated material, including mass attacks, during exercises, “as though it was being sensed for the first time by a radar site.” [US Department of Defense, 1/14/1999] However, Northern Vigilance is a military operation, not a training exercise. [NORAD, 9/9/2001; Chairman Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA) and witnesses Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and JCS Chairman General Richard Myers hold a House Hearing on the FY 2006 Budget for the Department of Defense and Military Services, 109th Congress, 1st session Congressional Record.')" onmouseout="return nd()">US Congress, 3/11/2005] So presumably the “simulated information” is part of a NORAD exercise currently taking place, such as Vigilant Guardian (see (6:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Therefore, many minutes into the real 9/11 attacks, there may have been false radar blips causing confusion among NORAD personnel. Additional details, such as whose radar screens have false blips and over what duration, are unknown. The Russians, after seeing the attacks on New York and Washington on television, will quickly communicate that they are canceling their Russian Arctic exercise. [Toronto Star, 9 December 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Toronto Star, 12/9/2001; National Post, 19 October 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">National Post, 10/19/2002]
Entity Tags: Operation Northern Vigilance, Vigilant Guardian, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Federal Aviation Administration, Mike Jellinek
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93, Military Exercises
Ed Ballinger, a flight dispatcher for United Airlines, is continuing to send messages one by one to the 16 transcontinental flights he is covering, warning them of the first WTC crash. He is handling both Flights 175 and 93, and 175 has failed to respond to his message. A few minutes after 9:00, he sends a message to Flight 93. The exact content of the message is not known, but apparently it doesn’t advise the pilots to bar the cockpit door. [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 28 October 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001; New York Observer, 17 June 2004.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Observer, 6/17/2004] Another flight controller at the Cleveland tower in charge of Flight 93 at the time later recalls, “I saw controllers step up to the plate and start warning flight crews. This was totally by the seat of their pants. It’s not because they’re directed to by anybody. It’s just, OK, everybody’s on alert right now.” [MSNBC Dateline.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Ballinger later says, “One of the things that upset me was that [the FAA and United Airlines headquarters] knew, 45 minutes before [Flight 93 crashed], that American Airlines had a problem. I put the story together myself [from news accounts]. Perhaps if I had the information sooner, I might have gotten the message to [Flight] 93 to bar the door.” [New York Observer, 17 June 2004.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Observer, 6/17/2004] Ballinger will send Flight 93 a second, more detailed warning that does warn to bar the door. It will reach Flight 93 at 9:24 a.m., shortly before the flight is hijacked.
Entity Tags: United Airlines, Federal Aviation Administration, Ed Ballinger
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Flight UA 175
Flight 175 hits the WTC South Tower. The picture was taken from a traffic helicopter. [Source: WABC 7/ Salient Stills]Flight 175 hits the South Tower of the World Trade Center (Tower Two). Seismic records pinpoint the time at six seconds before 9:03 a.m. (rounded to 9:03 a.m.). [New York Times, “The Tragic Timeline,” 12 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Times, 9/12/2001; CNN, “September 11: Chronology of terror,” 12 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 9/12/2001; CNN, “Officials: Government Failed to React to FAA Warning,” 17 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 9/17/2001; North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/18/2001; USA Today, 20 December 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">USA Today, 12/20/2001; World Trade Center Building Performance Study (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1 May 2002)., 1-10.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Federal Emergency Management Agency, 5/1/2002, pp. 1-10; Associated Press, “Terrorist Attacks Timeline,” 19 August 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 8/19/2002; USA Today, 2 September 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">USA Today, 9/2/2002; New York Times, 11 September 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Times, 9/11/2002] According to the NIST report, the crash time is 9:02:59. [Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade Center Towers (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2005)., 38.')" onmouseout="return nd()">National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 38 ] According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the crash time is 9:03:11. [Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 8.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 8] Millions watch the crash live on television. The plane strikes the 77th through 85th floors in the 110-story building. Approximately 100 people are killed or injured in the initial impact; 600 people in the tower eventually die. The death toll is far lower than in the North Tower because about two-thirds of the South Tower’s occupants have evacuated the building in the 17 minutes since the first tower was struck. [USA Today, 20 December 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">USA Today, 12/20/2001; Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade Center Towers (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2005)., 5-9, 41.')" onmouseout="return nd()">National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 5-9, 41 ] The combined death toll from the two towers is estimated at 2,819, not including the hijackers. [Associated Press, “Terrorist Attacks Timeline,” 19 August 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 8/19/2002] The impact severs some columns on the south side of the South Tower. Each of the Twin Towers is designed as a “tube-in-tube” structure and the steel columns which support its weight are arranged around the perimeter and in the core. The plane, which is traveling at an estimated speed of around 500 mph (see October 2002-October 2005), severs 33 of the building’s 236 perimeter columns and damages another one. [Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade Center Towers (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2005)., 39.')" onmouseout="return nd()">National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 39 ] The perimeter columns bear about half of the tower’s weight, so the damage to them reduces the tower’s ability to bear gravity loads by about 7.1 percent. [Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade Center Towers (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2005)., 6.')" onmouseout="return nd()">National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 6 ] The actual damage to the 47 core columns is not known, as there are no photographs or videos of it, but there will be much speculation about this after 9/11. It will be suggested that some parts of the aircraft may be able to damage the core even after crashing through the exterior wall (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade Center Towers (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2005)., 107.')" onmouseout="return nd()">National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 107 ] According to NIST’s base case model, five of the core columns are severed and another five suffer some damage. [Baseline Structural Performance and Aircraft Impact Damage Analysis of the World Trade Center Towers (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2005)., 235.')" onmouseout="return nd()">National Institute of Standards & Technology, 9/2005, pp. 235 ] This may reduce the tower’s ability to bear loads by a further approximately 8 percent, meaning that the aircraft impact accounted for a loss of about 15 percent of the building’s strength. This damage will be cited as an event contributing to the building’s collapse after 9/11 (see October 23, 2002 and October 19, 2004). NIST’s base case estimate of damage to the North Tower’s core will be similar, even though the aircraft impact there was dissimilar (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). Flight 11 hit the North Tower’s core head on, whereas Flight 175 only hits the corner of the South Tower’s core. [Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade Center Towers (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2005)., 20-23, 38-41.')" onmouseout="return nd()">National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 20-23, 38-41 ] In addition, some of the fireproofing on the steel columns and trusses may be dislodged (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Passive Fire Protection (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2005)., xxxvi, 83.')" onmouseout="return nd()">National Institute of Standards & Technology, 9/2005, pp. xxxvi, 83 ] Photographs and videos of the towers will not show the state of fireproofing inside the buildings, but the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) will try to estimate the damage to fireproofing using a series of computer models. Its severe case model (see (October 2002-October 2005)) will predict that 39 of the 47 core columns are stripped of their fireproofing on one or more floors and that fireproofing is stripped from trusses covering 80,000 ft2 of floor area, the equivalent of about two floors. NIST will say that the loss of fireproofing is a major cause of the collapse (see April 5, 2005), but only performs 15 tests on fireproofing samples (see October 26, 2005). [Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade Center Towers (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2005)., 41.')" onmouseout="return nd()">National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 41 ] According to NIST, less fireproofing is stripped from the North Tower (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001).
Entity Tags: National Institute of Standards and Technology, World Trade Center
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 175, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93, George Bush, World Trade Center, 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation
“Within minutes of the second impact,” Boston flight control’s Operations Manager instructs all flight controllers in his center to inform all aircraft in the New England region to monitor the events unfolding in New York and to advise aircraft to heighten cockpit security. Boston asks the FAA Command Center to issue a similar cockpit security alert to all aircraft nationwide. The 9/11 Commission concludes, “We have found no evidence to suggest that Command Center managers instructed any centers to issue a cockpit security alert.” [9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] United Airlines flight dispatchers give their pilots a cockpit warning about 20 minutes later.
Entity Tags: Boston flight control, Federal Aviation Administration, United Airlines
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93
Bill Peacock, the FAA director of air traffic services, is currently away from FAA headquarters for a meeting in New Orleans (see 8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). His staff called him earlier to alert him to the possible hijacking of Flight 11. He returned to his hotel room in time to see the second attack live on CNN. He quickly phones FAA headquarters, trying to contact his staff, and has his call added to the teleconference being run from the conference room next to his office. [Ground stop: An inside look at the Federal Aviation Administration on September 11, 2001 (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, Inc., 2003)., 12 and 22.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Freni, 2003, pp. 12 and 22] According to a statement provided by the FAA to the 9/11 Commission in 2003, this teleconference began “[w]ithin minutes” of the first WTC tower being hit (see (8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Yet the 9/11 Commission will later claim that it was not established until “about 9:20” (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001), which is about 15 minutes later than Peacock supposedly joined it. [Public Hearing: September 11, 2001: The Attacks And The Response and Reforming Civil Aviation Security: Next Steps.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003; Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 36.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 36]
Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Bill Peacock
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93
According to a book about the Federal Aviation Administration’s response on 9/11, the FAA Command Center sends a message to all the nation’s air traffic facilities at this time, announcing the first hijacking. [Ground stop: An inside look at the Federal Aviation Administration on September 11, 2001 (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, Inc., 2003)., 59.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Freni, 2003, pp. 59] This would be two minutes after it had been informed that the Flight 11 hijackers had announced, “we have [some] planes” (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Yet according to the 9/11 Commission, Indianapolis Center, which handles Flight 77, only learns that there are other hijacked aircraft “By 9:20” (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 23-24.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 23-24]
Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93
According to an early timeline laid out to CNN by unnamed but “informed defense officials,” the FAA informs NORAD at this time that Flight 93 may have been hijacked. [CNN, “Officials: Government Failed to React to FAA Warning,” 17 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 9/17/2001] In public testimony before the 9/11 Commission in 2003, NORAD officials will similarly claim that the FAA first reports the possible hijacking of Flight 93 at this time. [Public Hearing: September 11, 2001: The Attacks And The Response and Reforming Civil Aviation Security: Next Steps.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003] Yet this is 12 minutes before the hijacking is meant to have occurred (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Staff report: The four flights, 38.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 38 ] One explanation is put forward that could possibly help explain the discrepancy: There are media reports that “investigators had determined from the cockpit voice recorder from United Airlines Flight 93… that one of the four hijackers had been invited into the cockpit area before the flight took off from Newark, New Jersey.” Cockpit voice recordings indicate that the pilots believed their guest was a colleague “and was thereby extended the typical airline courtesy of allowing any pilot from any airline to join a flight by sitting in the jumpseat, the folded over extra seat located inside the cockpit.” [Fox News Edge.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Fox News, 9/24/2001; Herald Sun (Melbourne), 25 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Herald Sun (Melbourne), 9/25/2001] This would be consistent with passenger phone calls from the plane, describing only three hijackers on Flight 93 (see (9:27 a.m.-10:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., 120.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. 120] However, the reports will not be confirmed. The 9/11 Commission Report will dismiss the claim that NORAD was alerted at 9:16, stating, “In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD officials stated that at 9:16, NEADS received hijack notification of United 93 from the FAA. This statement was incorrect. There was no hijack to report at 9:16. United 93 was proceeding normally at that time.” [Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 34.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 34] No further explanations will be offered for the incorrect timelines. NORAD’s own initial timeline, released on September 18, 2001, will not give a time for when the FAA alerted it to Flight 93. It will only say that the FAA and its Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) “established a line of open communication discussing AA Flt 77 and UA Flt 93.” [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/18/2001]
Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Federal Aviation Administration
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
The FAA Command Center finally issues a nationwide alert to flight controllers to watch for planes disappearing from radar or making unauthorized course changes. [Washington Post, 3 November 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 11/3/2001]
Entity Tags: Indianapolis flight control, Federal Aviation Administration
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93
The FAA sets up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies, including the Defense Department. This is almost one hour after the FAA’s Boston flight control began notifying the chain of command (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001) and notified other flight control centers about the first hijacking at 8:25 a.m. (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001). According to the Acting FAA Deputy Administrator Monte Belger, this teleconference (called the “hijack net”) is “the fundamental primary source of information between the FAA, DOD, FBI, Secret Service, and… other agencies.” Yet even after the delay in setting it up, FAA and Defense Department participants later claim it plays no role in coordinating the response to the hijackings. The 9/11 Commission says, “The NMCC [National Military Command Center inside the Pentagon] officer who participated told us that the call was monitored only periodically because the information was sporadic, it was of little value, and there were other important tasks. The FAA manager of the teleconference also remembered that the military participated only briefly before the Pentagon was hit.” [Twelfth Public Hearing.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004; Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 36.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 36] According to a statement provided by the FAA to the 9/11 Commission in 2003, this teleconference began significantly earlier—“[w]ithin minutes after the first aircraft hit the World Trade Center” (see (8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Public Hearing: September 11, 2001: The Attacks And The Response and Reforming Civil Aviation Security: Next Steps.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003]
Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Monte Belger, 9/11 Commission, Federal Aviation Administration
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93, Key Day of 9/11 Events
According to some accounts, Vice President Cheney is in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House by this time, along with Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta and National Security Adviser Rice. Mineta says that, while a suspicious plane is heading toward Washington, an unidentified young man comes in and says to Cheney, “The plane is 50 miles out.” Mineta confers with Acting FAA Deputy Administrator Monte Belger, who is at the FAA’s Washington headquarters. Belger says to him, “We’re watching this target on the radar, but the transponder’s been turned off. So we have no identification.” According to Mineta, the young man continues updating the vice president, saying, “The plane is 30 miles out,” and when he gets down to “The plane is 10 miles out,” asks, “Do the orders still stand?” In response, Cheney “whipped his neck around and said, ‘Of course the orders still stand. Have you heard anything to the contrary?’” Mineta says that “just by the nature of all the events going on,” he infers that the order being referred to is a shoot-down order. Nevertheless, Flight 77 continues on and hits the Pentagon. [BBC, “Clear the Skies,” 1 September 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">BBC, 9/1/2002; ABC News Special.')" onmouseout="return nd()">ABC News, 9/11/2002; Public Hearing: September 11, 2001: The Attacks And The Response and Reforming Civil Aviation Security: Next Steps.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003; St. Petersburg Times, 4 July 2004.')" onmouseout="return nd()">St. Petersburg Times, 7/4/2004] However, the 9/11 Commission will later claim the plane heading toward Washington is only discovered by the Dulles Airport air traffic control tower at 9:32 a.m. (see 9:32 a.m. September 11, 2001). But earlier accounts, including statements made by the FAA and NORAD, will claim that the FAA notified the military about the suspected hijacking of Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m., if not before (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The FBI’s Washington Field Office was also reportedly notified that Flight 77 had been hijacked at about 9:20 a.m. (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The 9/11 Commission will further contradict Mineta’s account saying that, despite the “conflicting evidence as to when the Vice President arrived in the shelter conference room [i.e., the PEOC],” it has concluded that he only arrived there at 9:58 a.m. It also claims that Condoleezza Rice only entered the PEOC shortly after Cheney did. [9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] According to the Washington Post, the discussion between Cheney and the young aide over whether “the orders” still stand occurs later than claimed by Mineta, and is in response to Flight 93 heading toward Washington, not Flight 77. [Washington Post, 27 January 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 1/27/2002]
Entity Tags: Monte Belger, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Norman Mineta, Condoleezza Rice
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93, Dick Cheney, Key Day of 9/11 Events
According to journalist and author Jere Longman, “On all phone calls made from [Flight 93], passengers reported seeing only three hijackers. Not a single caller reported four hijackers.” [Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., 120.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. 120] (As an exception, one article in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette claims that passenger Todd Beamer describes four hijackers; however, other reports say he describes only three (see 9:45 a.m.-9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, “Flight 93: Forty lives, one destiny,” 28 October 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001] ) Yet the official claim is that there are four hijackers on this plane. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/27/2001; Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 4.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 4] Some family members of the passengers and crew will later be suspicious that one of the hijackers was in the plane’s cockpit from takeoff (see 9:16 a.m. September 11, 2001). However, according to Longman, “Investigators, pilots, flight attendants and United officials tended to discount this theory.… Paperwork would have to be filled out in advance if an observer requested to sit in the cockpit. No request was made for Flight 93, United officials later reported.… Flight 93 was hijacked approximately forty-five minutes after it left Newark. Other pilots agreed that Captain Dahl likely would have requested that any observer return to his regular seat by that time.” [Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., 120.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. 120] The 9/11 Commission’s explanation for the reports of three hijackers instead of four is that Ziad Jarrah, “the crucial pilot-trained member of [the hijacker’s] team, remained seated and inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside, he would not have been visible to the passengers.” [Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 12.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 12]
Entity Tags: Jere Longman
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls
Tom Burnett. [Source: Family photo]Tom Burnett calls his wife, Deena, using a cell phone and says, “I’m on United Flight 93 from Newark to San Francisco. The plane has been hijacked. We are in the air. They’ve already knifed a guy. There is a bomb on board. Call the FBI.” Deena connects to emergency 9-1-1. [ABC News, 12 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">ABC News, 9/12/2001; Toronto Sun, 16 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Toronto Sun, 9/16/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, “Flight 93: Forty lives, one destiny,” 28 October 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001; Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., 107.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. 107; MSNBC, 30 July 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 7/30/2002] Deena wonders if the call might have been before the cockpit was taken over, because he spoke quickly and quietly as if he was being watched. He also had a headset like phone operators use, so he could have made the call unnoticed. Note that original versions of this conversation appear to have been censored. The most recent account has the phone call ending with, “We are in the air. The plane has been hijacked. They already knifed a guy. One of them has a gun. They’re saying there is a bomb onboard. Please call the authorities.” [Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., 107.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. 107] The major difference from earlier accounts, is the mention of a gun. The call wasn’t recorded, but Deena’s call to 9-1-1 immediately afterwards was, and on that call she states, “They just knifed a passenger and there are guns on the plane.” [Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., 108.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. 108] Deena Burnett later says of her husband: “He told me one of the hijackers had a gun. He wouldn’t have made it up. Tom grew up around guns. He was an avid hunter and we have guns in our home. If he said there was a gun on board, there was.” [London Times, 11 August 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">London Times, 8/11/2002] This is the first of over 30 phone calls by passengers inside the plane. [MSNBC, 30 July 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 7/30/2002] Passengers are told what happened at the WTC in least five of the phone calls. Five calls show an intent to revolt against the hijackers. [San Francisco Chronicle, “Investigating 9-11 -- The Doomed Flights,” 23 July 2004.')" onmouseout="return nd()">San Francisco Chronicle, 7/23/2004]
Entity Tags: Tom Burnett, Deena Burnett
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls
Stacey Taylor. [Source: NBC News]Cleveland flight controller Stacey Taylor has been warned to watch transcontinental flights heading west for anything suspicious. She later recalls, “I hear one of the controllers behind me go, ‘Oh, my God, oh my God,’ and he starts yelling for the supervisor. He goes, ‘What is this plane doing? What is this plane doing?’ I wasn’t that busy at the time, and I pulled it up on my screen and he was climbing and descending and climbing and descending, but very gradually. He’d go up 300 feet, he’d go down 300 feet. And it turned out to be United 93.” (Note the time of this incident is not specified, but presumably it is prior to when Cleveland controllers note Flight 93 descends 700 feet at 9:29 a.m. [MSNBC Dateline.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 9/11/2002]
Entity Tags: Cleveland flight control, Stacey Taylor
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
Jason Dahl. [Source: Publicity photo]Flight 93 acknowledges a transmission from Cleveland flight control. John Werth, the controller handling the plane, has told it that another plane is 2,000 feet above it, at 37,000 feet. This is the last normal contact with the plane. [9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004; CBS News, 10 September 2006.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CBS News, 9/10/2006] According to the 9/11 Commission, less than a minute later, the controller, and pilots of aircraft in the vicinity, hear “a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin.” [Guardian, 17 October 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Guardian, 10/17/2001; Newsweek, 26 November 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Newsweek, 11/26/2001; 9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] Someone, presumably pilot Jason Dahl, is overheard by controllers as he shouts, “Mayday!” [New York Times, 22 July 2004.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Times, 7/22/2004] Seconds later, the controller responds: “Somebody call Cleveland?” Then there are more sounds of screaming and someone yelling, “Get out of here, get out of here.” [Toronto Sun, 16 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Toronto Sun, 9/16/2001; Newsweek, 22 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Newsweek, 9/22/2001; Observer, 2 December 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Observer, 12/2/2001; MSNBC, 30 July 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 7/30/2002; 9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] Then the voices of the hijackers can be heard talking in Arabic. The words are later translated to show they are talking to each other, saying, “Everything is fine.” [Newsweek, 26 November 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Newsweek, 11/26/2001] Later passenger phone calls describe two dead or injured bodies just outside the cockpit; presumably these are the two pilots. [New York Times, 22 July 2004.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Times, 7/22/2004]
Entity Tags: Cleveland flight control, John Werth, 9/11 Commission, Jason Dahl
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Key Day of 9/11 Events
The 9/11 Commission will later conclude that the four hijackers take over Flight 93 at 9:28 a.m., one minute after the plane’s crew made their last communication with the FAA’s Cleveland Center. According to the Commission, the hijackers “wielded knives (reported by at least five callers); engaged in violence, including stabbing (reported by at least four callers and indicated by the sounds of the cockpit struggle transmitted over the radio); relocated the passengers to the back of the plane (reported by at least two callers); threatened use of a bomb, either real or fake (reported by at least three callers); and engaged in deception about their intentions (as indicated by the hijacker’s radio transmission received by FAA air traffic control).” Flight 93 suddenly drops 685 feet in the space of just 30 seconds, and the Cleveland Center hears two suspicious radio transmissions from its cockpit (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, the 9/11 Commission will add, “While this appears to show the exact time that the hijackers invaded the cockpit, we have found no conclusive evidence to indicate precisely when the terrorists took over the main cabin or moved passengers seated in the first-class cabin back to coach.” The four hijackers waited about 46 minutes after takeoff before beginning their takeover of Flight 93.
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