John Werth. [Source: CBS]Shortly after hearing strange noises from the cockpit of Flight 93, Cleveland flight controllers notice the plane has descended about 700 feet. John Werth, the controller who is handling the plane, tells the supervisor nearest to him, “I think we have another one [i.e., another hijacking].” He will repeatedly radio the cockpit over the next four minutes, asking the pilot to confirm the hijacking, but receive no response. At 9:30 a.m., a controller asks other nearby flights on his frequency if they’ve heard screaming; several say that they have. [9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004; CBS News, 10 September 2006.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CBS News, 9/10/2006] However, despite these disturbing sounds and lack of contact with the plane, Cleveland doesn’t notify anyone else about it.
Entity Tags: John Werth, Cleveland flight control
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
The National Miilitary Command Center, inside the Pentagon. [Source: National Military Command Center]Captain Charles Leidig is temporarily in command of the National Military Command Center (NMCC), “the military’s worldwide nerve center.” In response to the attacks on the World Trade Center, he convenes a conference call. [CNN American Morning with Paula Zahn.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 9/4/2002; Statement of Capt Charles J. Leidig, Jr. Commandant of Midshipmen, United States Naval Academy.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 
] Telephone links are established between the NMCC located inside the Pentagon (but on the opposite side of the building from where the explosion will happen), Canada’s equivalent Command Center, Strategic Command, theater commanders, and federal emergency-response agencies. At one time or another, President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, key military officers, leaders of the FAA and NORAD, the White House, and Air Force One are heard on the open line. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 3 June 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/2002; 9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] NORAD command director Captain Michael Jellinek claims this call was initiated “at once” after the second WTC tower was hit. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 3 June 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/2002] However, the 9/11 Commission concludes it starts at 9:29 a.m. According to the commission, it begins as an all-purpose “significant event” conference. But at 9:30, Leidig states that it has just been confirmed that Flight 11 is still airborne and is heading toward Washington, DC. (This incorrect information apparently arose minutes earlier during a conference call between FAA centers (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001).) In response to this erroneous report, the significant event conference is ended at around 9:34. It then resumes at about 9:37 as an air threat conference call, which lasts for more than eight hours. [9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004; Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 37.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37] This is broadcast over a loudspeaker inside the NMCC. [US News and World Report, 31 August 2003.')" onmouseout="return nd()">US News and World Report, 8/31/2003] Brigadier General Montague Winfield, who later takes over from Leidig in charge of the NMCC, says, “All of the governmental agencies that were involved in any activity going on in the United States at that point, were in that conference.” [ABC News Special.')" onmouseout="return nd()">ABC News, 9/11/2002] The call continues right through the Pentagon explosion; the impact is not felt within the NMCC. [CNN American Morning with Paula Zahn.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 9/4/2002] However, despite being in the Pentagon when it is hit, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld doesn’t enter the NMCC or participate in the call until 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
Entity Tags: Mike Jellinek, Montague Winfield, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, George W. Bush, National Military Command Center, Federal Aviation Administration, Charles Leidig, Donald Rumsfeld
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93, George Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Pentagon
A small jet plane—ExecuJet 956—tracks Flight 93 for what is described as “a substantial period of time” before it crashes, and picks up some of the radio transmissions from it, as both planes are operating on the same frequency. [Government's motion for protective order regarding cockpit voice recorder pursuant to 49 USC 1154. United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui, 8/8/2002 ; Washington Post, 9 August 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 8/9/2002] The exact period over which ExecuJet 956 follows Flight 93 is unclear. But as early as 9:31 it calls the FAA’s Cleveland Center and, referring to Flight 93, reports: “[W]e’re just answering your call. We did hear that, uh, yelling too.” [Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 461.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 461] At 9:40, after being asked, “did you understand that transmission [from Flight 93]?” ExecuJet 956 tells Cleveland Center: “Affirmative. He said that there was a bomb on board.” [Associated Press, “Text of Flight 93 recording,” 12 April 2006.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 4/12/2006] Cleveland Center then asks the ExecuJet pilot if he can change course and try to spot Flight 93. He sees it, loses it, and then sees it again. He then has to make an evasive turn, as Flight 93 is heading directly for him. [Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., 104.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. 104] ExecuJet 956 is one of a fleet of small jets available for hire from a company based in Woodbridge, New Jersey called NetJets, which sells shares in private business aircraft. [Associated Press, 8 August 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 8/8/2002; Washington Post, 9 August 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 8/9/2002] NetJets’ owner is the multi-billionaire Warren Buffet. [Knight Ridder, 6 November 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Knight Ridder, 11/6/2001; Observer, 12 January 2003.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Observer, 1/12/2003] Another small business jet is reportedly within 20 miles of Flight 93 when it crashes, but this is apparently a different one, belonging to a North Carolina clothing firm (see 10:07 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Pittsburgh Channel, “FBI explains other planes at Flight 93 crash,” 15 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Pittsburgh Channel, 9/15/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 16 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/16/2001]
Entity Tags: Cleveland flight control
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
United Airlines begins landing all of its flights inside the US (Note: All planes nationwide were already ordered down at 9:26 a.m. (see (9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and told to land in a reasonable amount of time. Now they’re told to land immediately.) American Airlines begins landing all of their flights five minutes later. [Wall Street Journal, 15 October 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Wall Street Journal, 10/15/2001]
Entity Tags: United Airlines, American Airlines
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93
Shortly before Flight 93 reverses direction and heads east, someone in its cockpit radios in and asks the FAA for a new flight plan, with a final destination of Washington, DC. [ABC News, “Hijack Ends in Pennsylvania Crash: Officials Believe Terrorists Behind Crash of United Plane,” 11 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">ABC News, 9/11/2001; ABC News, “Timeline of Disaster: From Flight School Training to Buildings Collapsing,” 14 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">ABC News, 9/14/2001] Jeff Krawczyk, the chief operating officer of a company that tracks aircraft movements, later comments, “We hardly ever get a flight plan change. Very unusual.” [Washington Business Journal, 11 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Business Journal, 9/11/2001] Who it is that makes this request is unclear. The hijacker takeover of Flight 93 occurred around 9:28 a.m. (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001) [Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 11.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 11] , so it is presumably made by one of the hijackers. Twenty-five minutes later the pilot hijacker will also program a new destination into the plane’s navigational system (see 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001).
Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, who is in the White House Situation Room, requests a fighter escort for Air Force One and authorization for the Air Force to shoot down threatening aircraft. According to Clarke’s own account, when they see President Bush starting his short speech from the Booker Elementary School library on television (at about 9:30), he and others in the Situation Room briefly discuss getting the president away from the school to somewhere safer. Clarke then telephones the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House, which contains Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, among others. He speaks with Army Major Mike Fenzel and instructs him: “Mike, somebody has to tell the president he can’t come right back here [to Washington]. Cheney, Condi, somebody. Secret Service concurs. We do not want them saying where they are going when they take off. Second, when they take off, they should have fighter escort. Three, we need to authorize the Air Force to shoot down any aircraft—including a hijacked passenger flight—that looks like it is threatening to attack and cause large-scale death on the ground. Got it?” Fenzel replies, “Roger that, Dick, get right back to you.” This conversation appears to take place shortly before the Pentagon attack occurs, so roughly around 9:35 or 9:36, as soon afterwards Secret Service Director Brian Stafford slips Clarke a note stating that radar shows an aircraft heading their way (see (9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and then Ralph Seigler, the Situation Room deputy director, reports an explosion having occurred at the Pentagon. [Against all enemies: Inside America\'s war on terror (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2004)., 6-7.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Clarke, 2004, pp. 6-7] However, it is unclear how long it takes for Clarke’s requests to be implemented. According to some accounts, fighters do not arrive to accompany Air Force One until an hour or more after it takes off (see (Between 10:55 a.m. and 11:41 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Reports are also contradictory as to when shootdown authorization is given for the Air Force. According to Clarke’s own recollections, it is given between around 9:38 and 9:56 (see (9:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Other accounts, including that of the 9/11 Commission, state that it is not given until after 9:56, possibly as late as 10:20 (see (Shortly After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 10:18 a.m.-10:20 a.m. September 11, 2001).
Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Mike Fenzel
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93, Richard Clarke
The FAA’s Emergency Operations Center gets up and running, five minutes after the FAA issues an order grounding all civilian, military, and law enforcement aircraft. [Time, 14 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Time, 9/14/2001] This center’s role in the crisis response remains unclear.
Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93
Flight controllers mistakenly suspect that Delta Flight 1989, flying west over Pennsylvania, has been hijacked. The controllers briefly suspect the sound of hijackers’ voices in Flight 93 is coming from this plane, only a few miles away. USA Today reports the flight “joins a growing list of suspicious jets. Some of their flight numbers will be scrawled on a white dry-erase board throughout the morning” at FAA headquarters. Miscommunications lead to further suspicion of Flight 1989 even after the source of the hijackers’ message is confirmed to come from Flight 93. At some point, the Cleveland Airport flight control tower is evacuated for fear Flight 1989 will crash into it. Flight 1989 lands in Cleveland at 10:10 a.m. [USA Today, 13 August 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">USA Today, 8/13/2002; MSNBC Dateline.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 9/11/2002] The 9/11 Commission later has another explanation as to why Flight 1989 is suspected. They claim that Boston flight control identifies it as a possible hijacking strictly because it is a transcontinental 767 that had departed from Logan Airport. Although NEADS never loses track of the flight, it directs fighters from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it soon after 10:00 a.m. Delta 1989 is one of many erroneous reports of hijackings during the course of the morning (see (9:09 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
Entity Tags: Cleveland flight control, Unocal, Federal Aviation Administration, Logan Airport
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
)
Key events of Flight 93 (times are based on a Pittsburgh Post-Gazette map and otherwise interopolated). [Source: Yvonne Vermillion/ MagicGraphix.com] (click image to enlarge)Apparently, the only cockpit voice recording recovered undamaged from any of the 9/11 crashes is from Flight 93. It recorded on a 30-minute reel, which means that the tape is continually overwritten and only the final 30 minutes of any flight is recorded, though in practice sometimes the tape is slightly longer. Flight 93’s recording lasts 31 minutes and begins at this time. [Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., 206-207.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. 206-207; CNN, 19 April 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 4/19/2002; Hartford Courant, “MISSING,” 19 April 2004.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Hartford Courant, 4/19/2004] According to one account, it begins seconds before the plane is hijacked. [Washington Post, 17 November 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 11/17/2001] However, the version of the tape later played for the victims’ relatives begins “too late to pick up the sounds of the hijackers’ initial takeover.” [MSNBC, “Families of Those Aboard United Flight 93 Were Able to Listen to Cockpit Voice Recorder,” 18 April 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 4/18/2002]
(9:30 a.m.-2:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001: Langley Pilots Not Clearly Informed about Unfolding Events
Even after they take off, the three fighter pilots who are scrambled from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia are unaware of what is happening regarding the ongoing attacks. The three F-16s were airborne at 9:30 (see 9:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). But according to the 9/11 Commission, the pilots are “never briefed about the reason” they are scrambled. “The pilots [know] their mission [is] to divert aircraft, but [do] not know that the threat [is coming] from hijacked airliners.” [Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 27 and 45.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 27 and 45] One of the pilots, Captain Craig Borgstrom, will later recall that it is only when they see the burning Pentagon that they start piecing things together: “[A]s you get closer, you start thinking, ‘OK, maybe there’s some type of attack going on.’ You start correlating Washington, DC, with New York. We still have no ‘intel’ brief of what’s going on.… We knew something terribly wrong was going on.” [Air war over America (Collingdale, PA: Diane Publishing, 2004)., 65-66.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Filson, 2004, pp. 65-66] He says he “had no idea” that the Pentagon and World Trade Center had been hit by suicide terrorists in airplanes. [Christian Science Monitor, 16 April 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Christian Science Monitor, 4/16/2002] The Langley pilots will only learn about Flight 93 and a plane crashing in Pennsylvania when they return to their base at around 2:00 p.m. [Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., 222.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. 222]
Entity Tags: Craig Borgstrom
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93
Flight attendant Debbie Welsh is apparently stabbed. [Source: Family photo]A few minutes after 9:31 a.m., a hijacker on board Flight 93 can be heard on the cockpit voice recorder ordering a woman to sit down. A woman, presumably a flight attendant, implores, “don’t, don’t.” She pleads, “Please, I don’t want to die.” Patrick Welsh, the husband of flight attendant Debbie Welsh, is later told that a flight attendant was stabbed early in the takeover, and it is strongly implied it was his wife. She was a first-class attendant, and he says, “knowing Debbie,” she would have resisted. [Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., 207.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. 207]
Entity Tags: Debbie Welsh, Patrick Welsh
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
At the FAA’s Cleveland Center, an air traffic controller hears a transmission, presumably made by Flight 93 hijacker-pilot Ziad Jarrah, stating: “Ladies and gentlemen: Here the captain, please sit down, keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board. So, sit.” [Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 12.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 12; Staff report: The four flights, 39.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 39 ] As the 9/11 Commission later notes, “Like [Mohamed] Atta on Flight 11, Jarrah apparently did not know how to operate the communication radios; thus his attempts to communicate with the passengers were broadcast on the [air traffic control] channel.” [Staff report: The four flights, 98.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 98 ] While this communication is assumed to have come from Flight 93, an early FAA report states that it came “from an unknown origin.” [Summary of air traffic hijack events: September 11, 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Federal Aviation Administration, 9/17/2001 ] According to Newsweek, just prior to the communication, Cleveland Center controllers heard the sound of screaming from the flight. [Newsweek, 22 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Newsweek, 9/22/2001] The 9/11 Commission states that, around the time of the transmission, the plane’s cockpit voice recording indicates “that a woman, most likely a flight attendant, was being held captive in the cockpit. She struggled with one of the hijackers who killed or otherwise silenced her.” [Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 12.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 12; Staff report: The four flights, 39.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 39 ] Though the Cleveland air traffic controller understands the hijacker’s communication, he responds to it: “Calling Cleveland Center, you’re unreadable. Say again, slowly.” He also notifies his supervisor who passes the information up the chain of command, and the FAA’s Command Center is subsequently informed, “United 93 may have a bomb on board.” At 9:34 the Command Center will relay this information to FAA headquarters (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 28.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 28]
Entity Tags: Cleveland flight control, 9/11 Commission, Federal Aviation Administration
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
The FAA notifies United Airlines’ headquarters that Flight 93 is not responding to radio calls. This lack of response, combined with the plane’s turning to the east, causes United to believe, by 9:36 a.m., that the plane has been hijacked. [Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 456.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 456]
Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, United Airlines
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
The BBC reports that pilot Major Dean Eckmann gets a message as he’s flying from Langley, Virginia. “They said—all airplanes, if you come within (I believe it was) 30 miles of Washington, D.C., you will be shot down.” [BBC, “Clear the Skies,” 1 September 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">BBC, 9/1/2002] It’s not clear who “they” are and what authority they have. However, fighters are not actually given shootdown orders until later, if at all.
Entity Tags: Dean Eckmann
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93
FAA Administrator Jane Garvey notifies the video conference chaired by counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke that all aircraft have been ordered to land at the nearest field and reads a list of potential hijacks including Delta 1989 and United 93. [Against all enemies: Inside America\'s war on terror (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2004)., 5.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Clarke, 2004, pp. 5] Although, according to Clarke’s account, both General Richard Myers and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld are present at the conference at this point, the 9/11 Commission will later claim that the military was not notified about the hijacking of United 93 until over half an hour later (see 10:03 a.m. September 11, 2001).
Entity Tags: Richard B. Myers, Jane Garvey, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard A. Clarke
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
According to the 9/11 Commission, word of Flight 93’s hijacking reaches FAA headquarters. By this time, headquarters has established an open line of communication with the FAA Command Center at Herndon, Virginia. It had instructed the center to poll all flight control centers about suspect aircraft. So, at this time, the Command Center passes on Cleveland’s message: “United 93 may have a bomb on board.” The FAA headquarters apparently does not forward this information to the military, despite having the responsibility for doing so. Ben Sliney, the FAA’s national operations manager at its Herndon Command Center, will later recount, “I do know that all the information was being relayed to headquarters and, at least as far as we were concerned, it should have been. We thought it had been given to the military at each juncture.” The Command Center continually updates FAA headquarters on Flight 93 until it crashes. [9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004; CBC Newsworld.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CBC, 9/12/2006]
Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Ben Sliney
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
Tom Burnett calls his wife Deena a second time. He says, “They’re in the cockpit.” He has checked the pulse of the man who was knifed (later identified as Mark Rothenberg, sitting next to him in seat 5B) and determined he is dead. She tells him about the hits on the WTC. He responds, “Oh my God, it’s a suicide mission.” As they continue to talk, he tells her the plane has turned back. By this time, Deena is in constant communication with the FBI and others, and a police officer is at her house. [Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., 110.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. 110]
Entity Tags: Deena Burnett, Mark Rothenberg, Tom Burnett, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls
The San Francisco United Airlines maintenance center receives a call from an unnamed flight attendant on Flight 93 saying that the flight has been hijacked. The information is quickly passed on. [Public Hearing.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 1/27/2004] Within ten minutes, “everyone” in the United Airlines crisis center “now [knows] that a flight attendant on board had called the mechanics desk to report that one hijacker had a bomb strapped on and another was holding a knife on the crew.” [Wall Street Journal, 15 October 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Wall Street Journal, 10/15/2001]
Entity Tags: United Airlines
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
According to one account given by NEADS Commander Robert Marr, some time before around 9:36 when it changes direction, while it is still flying west, Flight 93 is being monitored by NEADS. Marr describes how, “We don’t have fighters that way and we think [Flight 93 is] headed toward Detroit or Chicago.” He says he contacts a base in the area “so they [can] head off 93 at the pass.” Not only does NORAD know about the flight, but also, according to NORAD Commander Larry Arnold, “We watched the 93 track as it meandered around the Ohio-Pennsylvania area and started to turn south toward DC.” (This change of direction occurs around 9:36 a.m.) [Air war over America (Collingdale, PA: Diane Publishing, 2004).')" onmouseout="return nd()">Filson, 2004] This account completely contradicts the 9/11 Commission’s later claim that NEADS is first notified about Flight 93 at 10:07 a.m. [9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
Entity Tags: Robert Marr, Larry Arnold, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Northeast Air Defense Sector
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
When Flight 93 is over Youngstown, Ohio, Stacey Taylor and other Cleveland flight controllers see it rapidly climb 6,000 feet above its assigned altitude of 35,000 feet and then rapidly descend. The plane drops so quickly toward Cleveland that the flight controllers worry they might be the target. Other accounts say the climb occurs around 9:35 a.m. Controllers continue to try to contact the plane but still get no response. [Guardian, 17 October 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Guardian, 10/17/2001; USA Today, 13 August 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">USA Today, 8/13/2002; 9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
Entity Tags: Stacey Taylor, Cleveland flight control
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
Several senior officials claim that the US military is tracking Flight 93 as it heads east and is ready to shoot it down if necessary.
Brigadier General Montague Winfield says that the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) has “received the report from the FAA that Flight 93 had turned off its transponder, had turned, and was now heading towards Washington, DC.” He adds, “The decision was made to try to go intercept Flight 93.” [ABC News Special.')" onmouseout="return nd()">ABC News, 9/11/2002] Major General Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region, says, “I was personally anxious to see what 93 was going to do, and our intent was to intercept it.” Three fighters have taken off from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia (see 9:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). According to Arnold, “we launched the aircraft out of Langley to put them over top of Washington, DC, not in response to American Airline 77, but really to put them in position in case United 93 were to head that way.” [Public Hearing: September 11, 2001: The Attacks And The Response and Reforming Civil Aviation Security: Next Steps.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003] He says, “as we discussed it in the conference call, we decided not to move fighters toward 93 until it was closer because there could have been other aircraft coming in,” but adds, “I had every intention of shooting down United 93 if it continued to progress toward Washington, DC… whether we had authority or not.” [Air war over America (Collingdale, PA: Diane Publishing, 2004)., 73.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Filson, 2004, pp. 73] NEADS Commander Robert Marr is reportedly “focused on United Flight 93, headed straight toward Washington.” He concurs with Arnold, saying, “United Airlines Flight 93 would not have hit Washington, DC. He would have been engaged and shot down before he got there.” [Air war over America (Collingdale, PA: Diane Publishing, 2004)., 73.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Filson, 2004, pp. 73] Marr and Arnold both say they were tracking Flight 93 even earlier on, while it was still it was still heading west (see Before 9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001).
Yet, completely contradicting these claims, the 9/11 Commission will conclude that the military only learned about Flight 93 around the time it crashed. It says the NMCC learned of the hijacking at 10:03 a.m. (see 10:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). Based upon official records, including recordings of the NEADS operations floor, it says NEADS never followed Flight 93 on radar and was first alerted to it at 10:07 a.m. (see 10:07 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 30-31, 34 and 42.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 30-31, 34 and 42; Washington Post, 30 April 2006.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 4/30/2006; Vanity Fair, 1 August 2006.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006]
Entity Tags: Montague Winfield, National Military Command Center, Robert Marr, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Larry Arnold
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Key Day of 9/11 Events
FAA’€™s Cleveland Center. [Source: ABC News]According to the 9/11 Commission, at about this time Cleveland flight control specifically asks the FAA Command Center whether someone has requested the military to launch fighters toward Flight 93. Cleveland offers to contact a nearby military base. The Command Center replies that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command have to make that decision and are working on the issue. [9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] Cleveland overheard a hijacker say there was a “bomb on board” at 9:32 a.m. and passed the message to FAA higher ups (see (9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to John Werth, the Cleveland controller handling Flight 93, “Within three or four minutes, probably, of when [the hijacking] happened, I asked if the military was advised yet. Had anybody called the military? They said, ‘don’t worry. That’s been taken care of,’ which I think to them, meant they had called the command center in Washington.” [CBS News, 10 September 2006.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CBS News, 9/10/2006]
Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, John Werth, Cleveland flight control
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
Having followed a seemingly normal course until now, after reaching the Cleveland area, Flight 93 suddenly makes a sharp turn to the south. It then makes another turn back eastward, cutting through West Virginia’s Northern Panhandle before re-entering Pennsylvania. [Washington Post, 12 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 9/12/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 13 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/13/2001; Staff report: The four flights, 41.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 41 ] Having thus turned 180 degrees, it now heads toward Washington, DC. [CNN, 13 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 9/13/2001]
According to a book about the FAA’s response to the 9/11 attacks, Cleveland Center air traffic controllers follow Flight 93 as it turns south and reverses course (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). But, “bomb threats called in concerning four other planes focused their attention onto what they believed to be more critical maneuvers.” [Ground stop: An inside look at the Federal Aviation Administration on September 11, 2001 (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, Inc., 2003)., 40.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Freni, 2003, pp. 40] One of these four planes is presumably Delta Flight 1989, which is mistakenly thought to be hijacked and to have a bomb aboard (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WKYC, 11 September 2006.')" onmouseout="return nd()">WKYC, 9/11/2006] The identities of the other three planes are unknown. By this time, Cleveland Center has already overheard a radio transmission from Flight 93 stating, “We have a bomb on board” (see (9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and has acknowledged this, reporting, “United 93 may have a bomb on board,” so it seems unlikely that other threatened aircraft would be regarded as “more critical maneuvers.” [9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
Entity Tags: Cleveland flight control
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
Captain Jim Hosking, piloting United Flight 890 from Japan to Los Angeles, is sent a warning message to his cockpit printer. It reads, “There has been a terrorist attack against United Airlines and American Airlines aircraft. We are advised there may be additional hijackings in progress. Shut down all access to the flight deck. Unable to elaborate further.” He tells his first officer, “Get out the crash axe.” Other pilots are receiving similar messages around this time. [USA Today, 13 August 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">USA Today, 8/13/2002]
Entity Tags: Jim Hosking
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Langley Fighters Still Short of Washington; Where and Why Is Not Clear
A typical F-16. [Source: NORAD]Accounts differ as to how far from Washington the F-16 fighters scrambled from Langley are when Flight 77 crashes. The Langley, Virginia, base is 129 miles from Washington. NORAD originally claimed that, at the time of the crash, the fighters are 105 miles away, despite having taken off seven minutes earlier. [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/18/2001] The 9/11 Commission claims that at 9:36 a.m., NEADS discovers that Flight 77 is only a few miles from the White House and is dismayed to find the fighters have headed east over the ocean. They are ordered to Washington immediately, but are still about 150 miles away. This is farther away than the base from which they took off. [9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] The F-16 pilot codenamed Honey (who is apparently Captain Craig Borgstrom) offers a different explanation. As previously mentioned, he says they are flying toward New York, when they see a black column of smoke coming from Washington, about 30 or 40 miles to the west. He is then asked over the radio by NEADS if he can confirm the Pentagon is burning. He confirms it. He says that the mission of the Langley pilots at this time is clear: to keep all airplanes away from Washington. The F-16s are then ordered to set up a defensive perimeter above Washington. [Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., 76.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. 76; Air war over America (Collingdale, PA: Diane Publishing, 2004)., 66.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Filson, 2004, pp. 66; New York Observer, 11 February 2004.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Observer, 2/11/2004] The maximum speed of an F-16 is 1,500 mph. [Associated Press, “F-16 Fighter Jet Crashes in Arizona After Pilot Ejects Safely,” 16 June 2000.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 6/16/2000] Had the fighters traveled straight to Washington at 1,300 mph, they would have reached Washington at least one minute before Flight 77. Furthermore, at the time the Pentagon is hit, according to Craig Borgstrom, he and the other Langley pilots are hearing a lot of chatter over their radios, but nothing about airliners crashing into buildings. He says they are “all three on different frequencies… and [are] getting orders from a lot of different people.” [Air war over America (Collingdale, PA: Diane Publishing, 2004)., 66.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Filson, 2004, pp. 66]
Entity Tags: Pentagon, Craig Borgstrom, Northeast Air Defense Sector
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93, Key Day of 9/11 Events
The Pentagon explodes. [Source: Donley/ Sipa]Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon. All 64 people on the plane are killed. A hundred-and-twenty-four people working in the building are killed, and a further victim will die in hospital several days later. [CNN, “Officials: Government Failed to React to FAA Warning,” 17 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 9/17/2001; North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/18/2001; Guardian, 17 October 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Guardian, 10/17/2001; Washington Post, 21 November 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 11/21/2001; USA Today, 13 August 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">USA Today, 8/13/2002; Associated Press, “Terrorist Attacks Timeline,” 19 August 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 8/19/2002; MSNBC, “What Happened on Flight 93? A story of heroism that inspired Americans in their darkest hours,” 3 September 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 9/3/2002; ABC News Special.')" onmouseout="return nd()">ABC News, 9/11/2002; CBS News, 11 September 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CBS News, 9/11/2002] Flight 77 hits the first floor of the Pentagon’s west wall. The impact and the resulting explosion heavily damage the building’s three outer rings. The path of destruction cuts through Army accounting offices on the outer E Ring, the Navy Command Center on the D Ring, and the Defense Intelligence Agency’s comptroller’s office on the C Ring. [The Pentagon: A history (New York: Random House, 2007)., 431 and 449.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Vogel, 2007, pp. 431 and 449] Flight 77 strikes the only side of the Pentagon that had recently been renovated—it was “within days of being totally [renovated].” [US Department of Defense, 9/15/2001] “It was the only area of the Pentagon with a sprinkler system, and it had been reconstructed with a web of steel columns and bars to withstand bomb blasts. The area struck by the plane also had blast-resistant windows—two inches thick and 2,500 pounds each—that stayed intact during the crash and fire. While perhaps, 4,500 people normally would have been working in the hardest-hit areas, because of the renovation work only about 800 were there.” More than 25,000 people work at the Pentagon. [Los Angeles Times, 16 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Los Angeles Times, 9/16/2001] Furthermore, the plane hits an area that has no basement. As journalist Steve Vogel later points out, “If there had been one under the first floor, its occupants could easily have been trapped by fire and killed when the upper floors collapsed.” [The Pentagon: A history (New York: Random House, 2007)., 450.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Vogel, 2007, pp. 450]
Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Pentagon
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Key Day of 9/11 Events, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93, George Bush, Pentagon
Lyz Glick. [Source: NBC]In phone calls made from Flight 93, some passengers and crew members sound as if they are able to keep surprisingly calm, despite the crisis: Passenger Jeremy Glick calls his wife, Lyz, at 9:37. She later recalls, “He was so calm, the plane sounded so calm, that if I hadn’t seen what was going on on the TV, I wouldn’t have believed it.” She says, “I was surprised by how calm it seemed in the background. I didn’t hear any screaming. I didn’t hear any noises. I didn’t hear any commotion.” [Bergen Record, 5 October 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Bergen Record, 10/5/2001; MSNBC, 11 September 2006.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 9/11/2006] Passenger Lauren Grandcolas calls her husband, Jack, at 9:39, and leaves a message on the answering machine. According to journalist and author Jere Longman, “It sounded to Jack as if she were driving home from the grocery store or ordering a pizza.” Jack Grandcolas later says, “She sounded calm.” He describes, “There is absolutely no background noise on her message. You can’t hear people screaming or yelling or crying. It’s very calm, the whole cabin, the background, there’s really very little sound.” [Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., 128.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. 128; United 93: The families and the film.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Kate Solomon, 2006; Washington Post, 26 April 2006.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 4/26/2006] Passenger Mark Bingham speaks on the phone with his mother and aunt, reportedly from around 9:42. His aunt finds him sounding “calm, matter-of-fact.” His mother later recalls, “His voice was calm. He seemed very much composed, even though I know he must have been under terrible duress.” She also says the background discussion between passengers, about taking back the plane, sounds like a “calm boardroom meeting.” [CNN Live Event/Special.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 9/12/2001; Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., 129-130.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. 129-130; CNN, 21 April 2006.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 4/21/2006] Passenger Todd Beamer speaks with GTE supervisor Lisa Jefferson for 13 minutes, starting at 9:45. Jefferson later says that Beamer “stayed calm through the entire conversation. He made me doubt the severity of the call.” She tells Beamer’s wife, “If I hadn’t known it was a real hijacking, I’d have thought it was a crank call, because Todd was so rational and methodical about what he was doing.” [Let\'s roll!: Ordinary people, extraordinary courage (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 2002)., 211.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Beamer and Abraham, 2002, pp. 211; Beliefnet (.com), 2006.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Beliefnet (.com), 2006] Passenger Honor Elizabeth Wainio speaks with her stepmother, Esther Heymann, from around 9:54. Heymann later tells CNN that Wainio “really was remarkably calm throughout our whole conversation.” (However, according to Jere Longman, although she speaks calmly, Wainio’s breathing is “shallow, as if she were hyperventilating.”) When her stepdaughter is not talking, Heymann reportedly cannot “hear another person. She could not hear any conversation or crying or yelling or whimpering. Nothing.” [Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., 168 and 171-172.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. 168 and 171-172; CNN Larry King Live.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 2/18/2006] Flight attendant Sandy Bradshaw calls her husband at 9:50. He later says, “She sounded calm, but like her adrenaline was really going.” [US News and World Report, 21 October 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">US News and World Report, 10/21/2001] At 9:58, flight attendant CeeCee Lyles phones her husband. He later says, “She was surprisingly calm,” considering the screaming he heard in the background. Her relatives attribute her calmness to her police training (she is a former police officer). [Dallas Morning News, 17 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Dallas Morning News, 9/17/2001; Investor\'s Business Daily, 18 April 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Investor's Business Daily, 4/18/2002]
Longman later writes, “I heard tapes of a couple of the phone calls made from [Flight 93] and was struck by the absence of panic in the voices.” [Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., xi.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. xi]
Entity Tags: Todd Beamer, Esther Heymann, Elizabeth Wainio, Sandy Bradshaw, CeeCee Lyles, Mark Bingham, Lisa Jefferson, Jack Grandcolas, Lyz Glick, Jere Longman, Jeremy Glick, Lauren Grandcolas
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls
According to his own account, Richard Myers, the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is on Capitol Hill, where he has been meeting with Senator Max Cleland (D). Apparently soon after he leaves this meeting, someone hands Myers a cell phone on which NORAD Commander Ralph Eberhart is calling. Myers later recalls that Eberhart “said, you know, we’ve got several hijack codes, meaning that the transponders in the aircraft are talking to the ground, and they’re saying we’re under, we’re being hijacked, several hijack codes in the system, and we’re responding with, with fighter aircraft.” [American Forces Press Service, 23 October 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">American Forces Press Service, 10/23/2001; MSNBC, 11 September 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Eberhart also tells him, “The decision I’m going to make is, we’re going to land everybody, and we’ll sort it out when we get them on the ground.” [Council on Foreign Relations, 29 June 2006.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006] He is presumably referring to a plan called SCATANA, which clears the skies and gives the military control over US airspace. However, Eberhart does not implement this until around 11:00 a.m. (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Twelfth Public Hearing.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] It is unclear exactly when this phone call is meant to take place, but it appears to be just before the time the Pentagon is hit, or just before Myers is informed of the Pentagon attack. [MSNBC, 11 September 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 9/11/2002; Statement of General Richard Myers, USAF, chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 ; Twelfth Public Hearing.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004; Council on Foreign Relations, 29 June 2006.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006; American Forces Press Service, 8 September 2006.')" onmouseout="return nd()">American Forces Press Service, 9/8/2006] Max Cleland will confirm that Myers meets with him on this morning, and is with him up to the time of the Pentagon attack, or shortly before. [General Myers Confirmation Hearing, 107th Cong., 1st sess.')" onmouseout="return nd()">US Congress, 9/13/2001; CNN Larry King Live.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 11/20/2001; Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 16 June 2003.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 6/16/2003] But according to counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, Myers is back at the Pentagon speaking over a video conference around ten minutes before the Pentagon is struck (see 9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Against all enemies: Inside America\'s war on terror (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2004)., 5.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Clarke, 2004, pp. 5]
Entity Tags: Richard B. Myers, Ralph Eberhart, Max Cleland
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93
Jeremy Glick. [Source: Family photo]Jeremy Glick calls his wife, Lyz, from Flight 93. He describes the hijackers as Middle Eastern- and Iranian-looking. According to Glick, three of them put on red headbands, stood up, yelled, and ran into the cockpit. He had been sitting in the front of the coach section, but he was then sent to the back with most of the passengers. Glick says the hijackers claimed to have a bomb, which looked like a box with something red around it. Family members immediately call emergency 9-1-1 on another line. New York State Police are patched in midway through the call. Glick finds out about the WTC towers. Two others onboard also learn about the WTC at about this time. Glick’s phone remains connected until the very end of the flight. [Toronto Sun, 16 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Toronto Sun, 9/16/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, “Flight 93: Forty lives, one destiny,” 28 October 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001; Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., 143.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. 143; MSNBC, 30 July 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 7/30/2002]
Entity Tags: Jeremy Glick
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls
After the Pentagon is hit, fighters at nearby Andrews Air Force Base are still preparing to launch. At some unknown point, flight squad commander Lieutenant Colonel Marc Sasseville assembles three F-16 pilots and gives them a curt briefing. He recalls saying, “I have no idea what’s going on, but we’re flying. Here’s our frequency. We’ll split up the area as we have to. Just defend as required. We’ll talk about the rest in the air.” All four of them dress up and get ready. One officer at Andrews recalls, “After the Pentagon was hit, we were told there were more [airliners] coming. Not ‘might be’—they were coming.” Meanwhile, a “flood” of calls from the Secret Service and local FAA flight control centers pour into Andrews, as the fighter response is coordinated. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9 September 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/2002] However, the loading of missiles onto the fighters is very time consuming, and when these fighters finally take off nearly an hour later, they will launch without the missiles installed.
Entity Tags: Andrews Air Force Base, Federal Aviation Administration, Secret Service, Marc Sasseville
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77, Flight UA 93
According to one account, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke is given the go-ahead to authorize Air Force jets to shoot down threatening aircraft around this time. In late 2003, Clarke will recall to ABC News that, minutes earlier, he’d picked up the phone in the White House Situation Room and called Vice President Dick Cheney, who is in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House. He’d told him: “We have fighters aloft now. We need authority to shoot down hostile aircraft.” [ABC News, 29 November 2003.')" onmouseout="return nd()">ABC News, 11/29/2003] This call appears to be one Clarke also describes in his 2004 book Against all Enemies, though in that account he will describe having made his request to Army Major Mike Fenzel, who is also in the PEOC, rather than directly to Cheney. According to that account, the call occurred shortly before Clarke learns of the Pentagon attack, so roughly around 9:36 (see (Between 9:30 a.m. and 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Against all enemies: Inside America\'s war on terror (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2004)., 6-7.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Clarke, 2004, pp. 6-7] Clarke describes to ABC News, “I thought that would take forever to get that [shootdown] authority.” But, “The vice president got on the phone to the president, got back to me, I would say within two minutes, and said, ‘Do it.’” [ABC News, 29 November 2003.')" onmouseout="return nd()">ABC News, 11/29/2003] If correct, this would mean the president authorizes military fighters to shoot down threatening aircraft at around 9:37-9:38. However, around this time, the president and vice president are reportedly having difficulty communicating with each other, while Bush heads from the Booker Elementary School to the Sarasota airport (see (9:34 a.m.-11:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [New York Times, 18 June 2004.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Times, 6/18/2004; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “The secret history of 9/11: The US government reacts,” 10 September 2006.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 9/10/2006] Furthermore, this account contradicts several others. In his 2004 book, Clarke will describe being told to inform the Pentagon it has shootdown authorization slightly later, some time between 9:45 and 9:56 (see (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Against all enemies: Inside America\'s war on terror (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2004)., 8.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Clarke, 2004, pp. 8] According to journalists Bob Woodward and Bill Sammon, Bush gives the shootdown authorization in a phone call with Cheney shortly after 9:56 (see (Shortly After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Fighting back: The war on terrorism from inside the Bush White House (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2002)., 102.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Sammon, 2002, pp. 102; Bush at war (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2002)., 17-18.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Woodward, 2002, pp. 17-18; Washington Post, 27 January 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 1/27/2002] The 9/11 Commission will say he gives it in a call at 10:18 (see 10:18 a.m.-10:20 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 41.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 41]
Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Richard A. Clarke
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, George Bush, Dick Cheney, Richard Clarke
Lauren Grandcolas. [Source: Family photo / AP]At 9:39 a.m., Flight 93 passenger Lauren Grandcolas calls her husband in San Rafael, California, leaving him a 46-second message on the answering machine. [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, “Flight 93: Forty lives, one destiny,” 28 October 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001; Staff report: The four flights, 42.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 42 ; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006] Some reports state that she is using a cell phone. [Houston Chronicle, “Mom\'s terror aboard plane difficult for daughter,” 12 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Houston Chronicle, 9/12/2001; Chicago Tribune, “Calls to family. then silence,” 14 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Chicago Tribune, 9/14/2001; USA Today, “United Flight 93 victims at a glance,” 25 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">USA Today, 9/25/2001] But the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette says she uses an Airfone. [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, “Flight 93: Forty lives, one destiny,” 28 October 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001] Her husband, Jack Grandcolas, later describes that she sounds “very, very calm.” [Associated Press, 12 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Associated Press, 9/12/2001] According to some early reports, she says, “We have been hijacked,” and “They”—presumably meaning the hijackers—“are being kind.” [Houston Chronicle, “Mom\'s terror aboard plane difficult for daughter,” 12 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Houston Chronicle, 9/12/2001; Washington Post, 12 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 9/12/2001; Chicago Tribune, “Calls to family. then silence,” 14 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Chicago Tribune, 9/14/2001; Time, 16 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Time, 9/16/2001] But in other accounts, she does not specify that her plane has been hijacked. She reportedly begins, “Honey, are you there? Jack, pick up sweetie. Okay, well I just wanted to tell you I love you. We’re having a little problem on the plane.” She continues, “I’m comfortable and I’m okay… for now. Just a little problem. So I just love you. Please tell my family I love them too. Bye, honey.” According to some accounts, Grandcolas then passes the phone to fellow passenger Elizabeth Wainio, who is sitting next to her, and tells her to call her family. [New York Times, 13 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">New York Times, 9/13/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, “Flight 93: Forty lives, one destiny,” 28 October 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001; Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., 128.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. 128; MSNBC, 11 September 2006.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 9/11/2006] The Wall Street Journal reports that Grandcolas’s voice can be heard at the end of her recorded message saying to another passenger, “Now you call your people.” [Wall Street Journal, 26 May 2005.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Wall Street Journal, 5/26/2005] Yet, according to a summary of passenger phone calls presented at the 2006 trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, this could not be the case, as Grandcolas tries to make a further seven calls over the following four minutes. These are apparently either unsuccessful or quickly disconnected, lasting between “0 seconds” and “7 seconds.” They appear to include four more attempts at calling her husband, and one attempt to call her sister Vaughn Lohec. According to the summary, Wainio does not make a phone call until later, at just before 9:54 a.m. The summary also claims that, although Wainio and Grandcolas had originally been assigned seats next to each other in row 11, they are now in different parts of the plane. While Wainio is in row 33, Grandcolas is now in row 23, and there is no passenger next to her who also makes a phone call. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006]
Entity Tags: Elizabeth Wainio, Lauren Grandcolas, Jack Grandcolas
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls
The Flight 93 hijackers (probably inadvertently) transmit over the radio: “Hi, this is the captain. We’d like you all to remain seated. There is a bomb on board. And we are going to turn back to the airport. And they had our demands, so please remain quiet.” [Boston Globe, 23 November 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Boston Globe, 11/23/2001; Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., 209.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. 209; MSNBC, “What Happened on Flight 93? A story of heroism that inspired Americans in their darkest hours,” 3 September 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 9/3/2002; 9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] The controller responds, “United 93, understand you have a bomb on board. Go ahead,” but there is no response. There was a very similar “bomb on board” warning from the same flight at 9:32 a.m. (see (9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The 9/11 Commission indicates that these are separate incidents. [9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] Cleveland flight control apparently continues to wait for FAA superiors to notify NORAD. Earlier in the morning, Boston flight control directly contacted NORAD (see (8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and local air force bases when they determined Flight 11 was hijacked.
Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Cleveland flight control, Federal Aviation Administration
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
Johnstown-Cambria County Airport. [Source: JMSA Today]At some time shortly before 10 a.m.—as early as 9:40 a.m. according to one report—air traffic manager Dennis Fritz, in the control tower at Johnstown-Cambria County Airport, 70 miles east of Pittsburgh, receives a call from Cleveland Air Traffic Control reporting a large, suspicious aircraft about 20 miles south of them, descending below six thousand feet. Despite the clear day, Fritz and his colleagues can see no plane approaching through binoculars. Soon afterwards, in response to another call from Cleveland, Fritz orders trainees and custodial staff to evacuate the tower, yet he is still unable to see any plane approaching. Less than a minute later, though, Cleveland calls a third time, saying to disregard the evacuation: The plane has turned south and they have lost radar contact with it. [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 12 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/12/2001; Knight Ridder, “Investigators Seek Black Box in PA,” 13 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Knight Ridder, 9/13/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, “Flight 93: Forty lives, one destiny,” 28 October 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001; Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., 197.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. 197] Wells Morrison is the agent in charge of the FBI’s Mon Valley Resident Agency, a satellite of its Pittsburgh field office. He too receives a phone call informing him of this flight, though he doesn’t say whom it is from. He contacts the Johnstown FBI office and instructs its agents to head to the Johnstown Airport. [Courage After the Crash: Flight 93 Aftermath--An Oral and Pictorial Chronicle (Somerset, PA: SAJ Publishing, 2002)., 109-110.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Kashurba, 2002, pp. 109-110] Flight 93 crashes around 10:03 a.m. or soon thereafter (see (10:03 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001), going down in a field just 14 miles south of Johnstown. [Washington Post, 13 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Washington Post, 9/13/2001]
Entity Tags: Dennis Fritz, Wells Morrison
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
The FAA’s Cleveland Center notifies the FAA’s Great Lakes Regional Operations Center about the screams and statements it heard from an unknown origin, but that are believed to have come from Flight 93. These transmissions were heard between 9:28 and 9:39 (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001, (9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Summary of air traffic hijack events: September 11, 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Federal Aviation Administration, 9/17/2001 ] The FAA’s Herndon Command Center and Washington headquarters were alerted to Flight 93 several minutes earlier (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Staff report: The four flights, 39.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 39 ]
Entity Tags: Cleveland flight control, Federal Aviation Administration
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
Newark, New Jersey, flight controller Bob Varcadapane is talking on the phone with the FAA Command Center. He is told that the Command Center is still suspicious of at least ten planes for one reason or another, all possible hijackings. [MSNBC Dateline.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 9/11/2002]
Entity Tags: Bob Varcadapane, Federal Aviation Administration
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
The transponder signal from Flight 93 ceases. [CNN, “Officials: Government Failed to React to FAA Warning,” 17 September 2001.')" onmouseout="return nd()">CNN, 9/17/2001; MSNBC, “What Happened on Flight 93? A story of heroism that inspired Americans in their darkest hours,” 3 September 2002.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 9/3/2002; MSNBC Dateline.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] However, the plane can be—and is—tracked using primary radar by Cleveland flight controllers and at United headquarters. Altitude can no longer be determined, except by visual sightings from other aircraft. The plane’s speed begins to vary wildly, fluctuating between 600 and 400 mph before eventually settling around 400 mph. [Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., 77, 214.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. 77, 214; 9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
Entity Tags: United Airlines, Cleveland flight control
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
Stacia Rountree. [Source: Vanity Fair]Colin Scoggins, Boston flight control’s military liaison, calls NEADS to alert it to Delta 1989, which is possibly off course and being tracked by Boston controllers. However, unlike flights 11, 175, 77, and 93, Delta 1989’s beacon code, broadcast from its transponder, is still working. At NEADS, ID tech Stacia Rountree tells her boss Maureen Dooley, “They think it’s possible hijack.… We have a code on him now.” They quickly locate the plane on radar, just south of Toledo, Ohio, and start alerting other FAA centers. NEADS starts contacting Air National Guard bases in that area to see if anyone can launch fighters. However, it will soon learn that the plane is not hijacked after all. [9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17: Improvising a Homeland Defense.')" onmouseout="return nd()">9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004; Vanity Fair, 1 August 2006.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006]
Entity Tags: Stacia Rountree, Maureen Dooley, Colin Scoggins, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Federal Aviation Administration
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
Greg Callahan. [Source: NBC News]Newark, New Jersey, flight controller Greg Callahan is talking on the phone to an FBI agent. The agent says about Flight 93: “We suspect that this aircraft has now been taken over by hostile forces.” The agent describes the sharp turn it has made over eastern Ohio and that it is now heading back over southwestern Pennsylvania. Callahan says he could tell the plane is on a course for Washington. [MSNBC Dateline.')" onmouseout="return nd()">MSNBC, 9/11/2002] The FBI has been in contact with Deena Burnett and informed of what her husband, Flight 93 passenger Tom Burnett, has been saying since at least 9:34 a.m. (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001) [Among the heroes: United Flight 93 and the passengers and crew who fought back (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002)., 110.')" onmouseout="return nd()">Longman, 2002, pp. 110] It is unclear where in the chain of command details of these Flight 93 calls reach, and the 9/11 Commission has not clarified the issue of what the FBI knew and when.
Entity Tags: Tom Burnett, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Deena Burnett, Greg Callahan
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93
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